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1HE UTILI1Y AND EFFICACY OF 1HE 
RLUIPA: WAS IT A WASTE? 
SARA SMOLIK* 
Abstract: The Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act was 
Congress's second attempt to undo the Supreme Court's decision in 
Employment Division, Department of Human Resources v. Smith, and thus 
increase the level of scrutiny used in evaluating land use laws under the 
Free Exercise Clause. This Note first analyzes the constitutionality of the 
Act, concluding that the Supreme Court would likely find the Act 
unconstitutional, even though lower federal courts may hesitate to do so. 
Second, regardless of the constitutionality of the Act, this Note concludes 
that it does not serve the purpose it was designed for, as the exceptions 
written into Smith cover the situations the Act was designed to "protect." 
More detrimentally, the mere existence of the Act dissuades further 
development of free exercise jurisprudence. 
INTRODUCTION 
This Note examines the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized 
Persons Act (RLUIPA) ,1 a statute at the intersection of the First 
Amendment and land use law. Mter discussing the Act's history and 
the constitutional debate surrounding its constitutionality, this Note 
analyzes how Congress's decision to focus its attention on the friction 
between religious groups and land use laws shapes evolving free exer-
cise jurisprudence. The conclusion reached is that, while most federal 
courts would likely find the RLUIPA constitutional, it may still be both 
redundant in effect, and unnecessarily stultifying to the development 
of free exercise jurisprudence. 
Part I of the Note will examine the legislative history of the Act, 
including previous congressional attempts to pass religious liberty leg-
islation and the jurisprudential context in which the RLUIPA arose. 
Part II will examine the question of whether or not the statute is con-
stitutional. Several commentators have weighed in on this debate, but 
only a few courts have dealt with the question of the RLUIPA's consti-
tutionality head-on. Part III will address the broader question of 
* Note Editor, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW REVIEW, 2003-04. 
1 42 U .S.C. §§ 2000cc to cc-5 (2000). 
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whether or not the statute is helpful to the goal of religious liberty, 
useful to the development of free exercise doctrine, and effective in 
its resolution of land use disputes. Finally, Part IV will consider how 
legislation that regulates religious freedom in the land use context 
influences the larger debates about the proper development of free 
exercise rights and the necessity of such legislation in the land use 
context. 
I. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND CONTEXT 
On September 22, 2000, President Clinton signed into law the 
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act,2 following over 
three years of congressional hearings3 and intense efforts by interest 
groups as diverse as the American Civil Liberties Union and the Chris-
tian Legal Society.4 The RLUIPA is Congress's second attempt5 to 
undo the Supreme Court's decision in Empluyment Division, Department 
of Human Resources v. Smith,6 in which the Court held that neutral laws 
of general applicability, although they may burden religious exercise, 
should be evaluated using rational basis review7-the least stringent of 
the Court's three levels of constitutional scrutiny.s Congress's first at-
2Id. 
5 146 CONGo REc. S7774 (daily ed. July 27, 2000) (joint statement of Sen. Hatch and 
Sen. Kennedy). 
4 146 CONGo REc. S7777 (daily ed. July 27, 2000) (letter from the Coalition for the Free 
Exercise of Religion). 
5 See Caroline R. Adams, Note, The Constitutional Validity of the Religious Land Use and In-
stitutionalized Persons Act of 2000: WiU RLUIPA 's Strict Scrutiny Survive the Supreme Court s Strict 
Scrutiny', 52 FORDHAM L. REv. 2361, 2364 (2002). In the time between the Supreme 
Court's decision in City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997), and the RLUIPA's passage, 
Congress had drafted two bills-the Religious Liberty Protection Acts of 1998 and 1999; 
neither of these laws were enacted. Id. The prior bills were more expansive, but failed to 
pass because of concerns about the proposed legislation's impact on existing civil rights 
statutes. See 146 CONGo REc. E1563 (daily ed. Sept. 22, 2000) (statement of Rep. Canady); 
146 CONGo REc. S7777 (daily ed.July 27,2000) (letter from the Leadership Conference on 
Civil Rights). 
6494 U.S. 872(1990). 
7 Smith, 494 U.S. at 885. 
8 The Supreme Court has developed three tiers of review for evaluating laws that may 
have the effect of infringing on an individual's constitutional rights. Under rational basis 
review, the least stringent level of scrutiny, a law will be upheld if it is rationally related to a 
legitimate government purpose. Under intermediate scrutiny, the Court will uphold the 
law so long as it is substantially related to an important government purpose, and the 
means to achieve that purpose has a substantial relationship to the ends being sought. 
Finally, under strict scrutiny, the Court will uphold the challenged law only if the govern-
ment can prove that the law is necessary to achieve a compelling state interest and that the 
government cannot achieve this purpose through any less restrictive means. See ERWIN 
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tempt to undo Smith was in 1993, with the Religious Freedom Restora-
tion Act (RFRA),9 a law that was significantly undermined four years 
after its passage by the Court's decision in City of Boerne v. Flores. 10 
To understand the impetus for the RLUIPA's passage, and Con-
gress's decision to create religious liberty legislation specific to land 
use, it is important to have a sense of the constitutional landscape in 
the years preceding that event, particularly the intersection of the Su-
preme Court's free exercise jurisprudence with its federalism juris-
prudence. This section will provide an analysis of the two cases that 
stand as bookends at either end of the Supreme Court's first thirty 
years of free exercise case law: Sherbert v. Verner and Employment Divi-
sion, Department of Human Resources v. Smith. A clear understanding of 
free exercise law as defined by the Court is important to unlocking 
the second element of this section-the struggle between Congress 
and the Supreme Court to define, with some finality, the extent of 
religious free exercise under the First Amendment.11 Thus, this sec-
tion will also examine the Court's handling of the RLUIPA's predeces-
sor, the RFRA, in City of Boerne v. Flores. 
A. Sherbert and Smith: A Supreme Court Free Exercise Doctrine in Tension 
The RLUIPA requires that, in cases where government substan-
tially burdens religious exercise, the government actor must show that 
imposing such a burden on the religious actor, institution, or organi-
zation serves a compelling government interest and uses the least re-
strictive means to achieve that interest. 12 The RLUIPA applies to state 
and local decisions regarding land use policies that may, incidentally 
CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITIITIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES §§ 9.2-9.4 (1997). Before 
Smith, the Court had used strict scrutiny to evaluate laws which had the effect of burdening 
religious exercise. See id. § 12.3.2. 
942 U.S.C. § 2000bb (2000). 
10 521 U.S. 507, 511 (1997); 146 CONGo REC. E1564 (daily ed. Sept. 22, 2000) (state-
ment of Rep. Canady) (explaining that the effect of the Supreme Court's holding in City of 
Boernewas to eliminate all of the statute's references to the states and leave "RFRA applica-
ble only to the federal government"); see also Kikumura v. Hurley, 242 F.3d 950, 959-60 
(10th Cir. 2001) (holding that RFRA is still applicable to the federal government). 
11 "RLUIPA is the most recent in a series of tugs and pulls between Congress and the 
Supreme Court to define the scope and extent of the Free Exercise Clause." Cottonwood 
Christian Ctr. V. Cypress Redevelopment Agency, 218 F. Supp. 2d 1203, 1220 (C.D. Cal. 
2002). 
12 146 CONGo REC. S7774 (daily ed. July 27, 2000) (joint statement of Sen. Hatch and 
Sen. Kennedy). 
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or overtly, burden religious exercise.13 The RLUIPA, like the RFRA 
before it, is an attempt to return to the strict scrutiny standard of re-
view that the Supreme Court set forth and applied to free exercise 
claims in Sherbert v. Verner. 14 Sherbert involved a challenge to the appli-
cation of the South Carolina Unemployment Compensation Act, 
which provided that individuals who failed, without good cause, to 
accept work offered to them by the employer or the employment 
office were not eligible for unemployment benefits.15 Adell Sherbert, 
a Seventh Day Adventist, was fired from her job because she refused 
to work on Saturdays, the Sabbath of her faith. 16 A prohibition against 
labor on Saturdays is a "basic tenet" of the Seventh Day Adventist 
creedP Ms. Sherbert failed to find new employment because all of 
the mills near her home, like her former employer, required employ-
ees to work Saturdays)8 
The Sherbert Court applied strict scrutiny to the South Carolina 
law.19 The Court indicated that this heightened level of scrutiny was 
appropriate because the law infringed on one of Ms. Sherbert's fun-
damental rights.2o The Court held that the state's asserted interest in 
avoiding the risk that some people might file fraudulent claims feign-
ing religious exemption was insufficient to meet the requirements of 
strict scrutiny.21 Specifically, the Court reasoned that South Carolina's 
interest was not compelling enough to require Ms. Sherbert to 
"choose between following the precepts of her religion and forfeiting 
benefits, on the one hand, and abandoning one of the precepts of her 
religion in order to accept work, on the other hand. "22 The Court 
made clear that its holding did not invalidate the South Carolina law 
generally, but it prevented the state from applying it in such a manner 
that it constrained the religious practice of workers who applied for 
13 See id. The RLUIPA, as its name suggests, also applies to laws which regulate indi-
viduals in prisons, mental hospitals, and similar state institutions. This note, however, will 
focus only on those aspects of the RLUIPA which apply to land use. 
14 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963); see 146 CONGo REe. E1563 (daily edt Sept. 22, 2000) 
(statement of Rep. Canady) ("The phrase 'in furtherance of a compelling governmental 
interest' is taken directly from RFRA, which was enacted in 1993; the phrase was and is 
intended to codifY the traditional compelling interest test."). 
15 374 U.S. at 400-0l. 
16 Id. at 399. 
17Id. at 399 n.l. 
18Id. at 399 n.2. 
19 Id. at 403. 
20 See id. at 403. (citing NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963». 
21 Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 407. 
22 Id. at 404. 
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unemployment benefits.23 The effect of the Sherbert decision was to 
require the use of strict scrutiny to evaluate laws that burdened an 
individual's free exercise of religion, and this was the doctrine the 
Court applied to such cases for nearly thirty years.24 
Many critics and scholars felt that the Court's free exercise juris-
prudence took a dramatic shift in the 1990 decision, Employment Divi-
sion, Department of Human Resources v. Smith. 25 Smith held that a state 
regulation prohibiting the use of peyote, a hallucinatory drug used in 
some Native American sacraments, did not violate the First Amend-
ment's Free Exercise Clause.26 Respondents in Smith were fired from 
their jobs after their employer learned that they had ingested peyote 
for sacramental purposes as part of their participation in a Native 
American religious ceremony.27 Oregon's Employment Division, the 
agency responsible for disbursement of unemployment benefits, re-
fused to grant the two respondents benefits because they had been 
dismissed for work-related misconduct. 28 The State argued that be-
cause peyote use was illegal under Oregon state law, the respondents 
had no right to consume peyote, despite their religious motivations. 29 
The Court agreed that the legality of peyote use was relevant to the 
employee's constitutional claim, and that the question before it was 
whether Oregon's prohibition on peyote-without exception for re-
ligious use-was permissible under the First Amendment.3o 
The Court chose not to apply the holding of Sherbert and its 
progeny to the facts in Smith, holding that the test developed in Sher-
bert was, at its most narrow, specific to the context of unemployment 
compensation and, at its most broad, specific to those situations 
where "individualized governmental assessment of the reasons for the 
relevant conduct" was at issue.31 The Court read the holding of the 
Sherbert line of cases narrowly, restricting them to the "proposition 
that where the State has in place a system of individual exemptions, it 
23Id. at 410. 
24 See infra text accompanying notes 24-35. 
25 See 494 U.S. 872, 908 (1990) (Blackmun, j., dissenting) (arguing that the Court's 
decision "effectuates a wholesale overturning of settled law concerning the Religion 
Clauses of om Constitution."); id. at 891 (O'Connor, j., concurring) ("In my view, today's 
holding dramatically departs from well-settled First Amendment jurisprudence .... "). 
26 Smith, 494 U.S. at 878-79. 
27Id. at 874. 
28Id. 
29 Id. at 875. 
:lO Id. at 875-76. 
31 Id. at 884. 
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may not refuse to extend that system to cases of 'religious hardship' 
without compelling reason. "32 Because the question in Smith was not 
whether the Employment Division failed to take the employees' relig-
ious beliefs into account when evaluating their dismissal from their 
jobs and subsequent request for unemployment benefits, but rather, 
whether Oregon's general ban on peyote use violated the First 
Amendment, the Court held that the holding in Sherbert was not ap-
plicable to the facts in Smith.33 Thus, the Court held that strict scru-
tiny, or the compelling interest test, was not an appropriate tool for 
evaluating facially neutral, generally applicable laws.34 
B. The Religious Freedom Restoration Act and City of Boerne: A Fight for 
the Last Word with Federalism Implications 
Congress's passage of the RFRA was a direct response to the Su-
preme Court's decision in Smith, and the statute's broad language ap-
plied to all situations in which an individual or organization argued 
that the impact of government action, even when the unintended ef-
fect of generally applicable laws substantially burdened free exercise 
of religion.35 In 1997, the Supreme Court in City of Boerne v. Flores de-
clared that the RFRA exceeded Congress's powers under Section Five 
of the Fourteen th Amendment. 36 
City of Boerne involved a challenge to a local zoning ordinance in 
Texas that prevented the enlargement of St. Peter's Catholic Church, 
a mission style building in the city's historic district.37 The Archbishop 
of San Antonio challenged the city's actions under the RFRA, and the 
city responded by arguing that the statute was unconstitutional be-
cause it exceeded the scope of Congress's Fourteenth Amendment 
enforcement power.38 Although the facts in City of Boerne involved a 
First Amendment challenge, the case is best understood in the con-
text of the Court's federalism jurisprudence because the bulk of the 
Court's analysis focused not on the Church's free exercise claim, but 
on the scope of congressional power under the Constitution.39 City of 
32 Smith, 494 U.S. at 884 (quoting Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 708 (1986)). 
33 See id. at 883-85. 
34 See id. at 884-86. 
35 Adams, supra note 5, at 2371; see also City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 512 
(1997) . 
36 City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 536. 
37 Id. at 511-12. 
38 Id. at 512. 
39 See infra Part II.B. 
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Boerne is important to this discussion both because of its place in the 
continuing dialog between the Supreme Court and Congress over the 
Free Exercise Clause, and because the facts of the case-a challenge 
to a city zoning ordinance-reflect the kind of situation Congress is 
seeking to prevent in the RLUIPA by focusing its remedial power on 
local land use legislation. 
In holding that the RFRA's provisions did not apply to the states, 
the Court made two essential points.4o First, the Court distinguished 
between the power of Congress under Section Five of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to enforce constitutional rights and the power of the ju-
diciary to define what the law is, as articulated in Marbury v. Madison.41 
Because the RFRA's stated purpose was to undo the perceived damage 
of Smith, the Court argued that the statute altered the meaning of the 
Free Exercise Clause as defined by the Supreme Court. 42 In a state-
ment that reveals the protective territoriality of each branch, the 
Court concluded that, "Congress does not enforce a constitutional 
right by changing what the right is. "43 Second, the Court reiterated 
the principle that whenever Congress acts pursuant to its Section Five 
powers "[t]here must be a congruence and proportionality between 
the injury to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to 
that end."44 Based on the legislative history of the RFRA, the Court 
found that Congress acted without a significant showing of state ac-
tion that effectuated religious bigotry.45 More damning, however, was 
the Court's determination that the RFRA was wildly out of proportion 
with any suggested constitutional threat, reaching into every level of 
government and touching laws of every type.46 The combined effect 
of these two flaws-the improper use of Section Five remedial powers 
and the lack of congruence and proportionality-upset the balance of 
power between the legislative and the judicial branches.47 The effect 
of the Court's holding was to invalidate the RFRA in its application to 
state and local governments, and thus, to curb Congress's power to 
increase the scope of protection for religious expression. 
40 See City of Boerne. 521 U.S. at 519-20. 
41 Id. at 516--19 (citing Marbury v. Madison. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803)). 
42 See id. at 512.519. 
43Id. at 519. 
44 Id. at 520. 
45 Id. at 531-32. 
46 City of Boerne. 521 U.S. at 532-35. 
47 Id. at 536. 
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The RLUIPA is a concerted effort on the part of Congress to pro-
tect religious expression in areas where it is perceived to be regularly 
threatened while, at the same time, avoiding the pitfalls of the Court's 
free exercise and federalism jurisprudence.48 The language of the 
statute carefully tracks the language of the Supreme Court in both 
Smith and City oj Boerne. Critics, however, still disagree as to whether or 
not the RLUIPA passes constitutional muster. 
II. Is THE ACT CONSTITUTIONAL? 
The RLUIPA's drafters assert three bases for Congress's authority 
to enact the legislation: the Spending Clause, the Commerce Clause, 
and Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment.49 As of this writing, 
only a handful of courts have had an opportunity to hear RLUIPA 
challenges, and even fewer have ruled directly on the constitutionality 
of the statute in a land use context.50 This section will examine the 
three bases upon which Congress asserted its authority to enact the 
RLUIPA in light of recent court decisions, the Supreme Court's Smith 
and City oj Boerne decisions, and scholarly commentary. 
A. Congressional Authority Under the Spending Clause 
Section (a) (2) (A) of the RLUIPA states that the statute applies to 
any situation in which a "substantial burden is imposed in a program 
or activity that receives Federal financial assistance, even if the burden 
48 See Cottonwood Christian Ctr. v. Cypress Redevelopment Agency, 218 F. Supp. 2d 
1203, 1221 n.7 (C.D. Cal. 2002) ("Because RLUIPA is based on the Spending and Com-
merce Clauses, and the codification of current precedent on individualized assessments 
... RLUIPA would appear to have avoided the flaws of its predecessor RFRA, and be within 
Congress's constitutional authority.") Cf. United States v. Maui, 298 F. Supp. 2d 1010, 1015 
(D. Haw. 2003) ("Although RLUIPA does 'intrude' to some extent on local land use deci-
sions, there is nothing about it that violates the principles of federalism [or the Tenth 
Amendment] ... if the federal statute is otherwise grounded in the Constitution. RLUIPA 
is not federal zoning of county land; it is federal enforcement offederal rights."). 
49 146 CONGo REc. S7775 (daily ed. July 27, 2000) (joint statement of Sen. Hatch and 
Sen. Kennedy); 146 CONGo REc. E1563 (daily ed. Sept. 22, 2000) (statement of Rep. Ca-
nady). 
50 See, e.g., Freedom Baptist Church of Del. County V. Township of Middletown, 204 
F. Supp. 2d 857, 874-76 (E.D. Pa. 2002) (holding that RLUIPA did not offend the Consti-
tution or the federal structure, but recognizing the issue as one in "which there is substan-
tial ground for difference of opinion" and certifYing a question about the law's constitu-
tionality to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit). Cf. Elsinore Christian Ctr. v. 
City of Lake Elsinore, 291 F. Supp. 2d 1083, 1103 (C.D. Cal. 2003) (holding that because 
RLUIPA "was enacted without the ambit of congressional authority, it is unconstitutional"). 
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results from a rule of general applicability. "51 This section mirrors the 
language of other civil rights statutes.52 The Spending Clause provi-
sions of the RLUIPA are patterned after similar provisions in other 
federal civil rights laws, such as Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 
and is in concert with existing Supreme Court case law allowing Con-
gress to attach conditions on federal spending, so long as those condi-
tions are germane to the federally-funded program.53 As is to be ex-
pected, RLUIPA cases thus far have involved challenges to state and 
local land use regulations, and courts have not found it necessary to 
evaluate the statute in light of Congress's Spending Clause authority. 54 
It is unlikely that this section will be relevant to the majority of chal-
lenges involving land use regulations that are brought under the 
RLUIPA because most land use regulation is local and is not funded 
through grants from the federal government. 
B. Congressional Authority Under the Commerce Clause 
More controversial than the RLUIPA's section addressing its origin 
in the Spending Clause is section (a)(2)(B), which places the statute 
within the scope of Congress's authority under the Commerce Clause.55 
This section extends the RLUIPA's scope over any case where "the sub-
stantial burden [on religious exercise] affects, or removal of that sub-
stantial burden would affect, commerce with foreign nations, among 
the several States, or with Indian tribes, even if the burden results from 
a rule of general applicability. "56 This section is referred to as the 'Ju-
risdictional elemen t" of the statute; it must be satisfied in cases asserting 
a RLUIPA challenge to a law of general applicability. 57 Conscious of the 
Supreme Court's recent rulings in Commerce Clause cases, 58 propo-
nents of the RLUIPA were careful to address how religious exercise fits 
51 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a) (2) (A) (2000). 
52 146 CONGo REc. S7775 (daily ed. July 27, 2000) (joint statement of Sen. Hatch and 
Sen. Kennedy) (citing Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and South Dakota v. Dole, 
483 U.S. 203 (1987), for the proposition that Congress is permitted to "attach germane 
conditions to federal spending"). 
53 146 CONGo REc. S7775 (daily ed. July 27, 2000) . (joint statement of Sen. Hatch and 
Sen. Kennedy). 
54 See, e.g., Freedom Baptist Church, 204 F. Supp. 2d at 865 n.10. 
55 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(2) (B). 
56Id. 
57 146 CONGo REC. E1563 (daily ed. Sept. 22, 2000) (statement of Rep. Canady). 
58 See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 610 (2000); United States v. Lopez, 514 
U.S. 549, 551 (1995) (together standing for the proposition that Congress cannot use its 
power under the Commerce Clause to regulate non-commercial activities, no matter how 
much those activities may affect interstate commerce). 
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within the scope of Congress's power to regulate interstate commerce.59 
As Representative Canady, co-sponsor of the House version of the bill, 
explained, "[t]his subsection does not treat religious exercise itself as 
commerce, but it recognizes that the exercise of religion sometimes 
requires commercial transactions, as in the construction, purchase, or 
ren tal of buildings. "60 
A handful of courts have addressed the issue of the RLUIPA's vi-
ability under the Commerce Clause. For example, Freedom Baptist 
Church v. Township oj Middletown, involved a challenge to town zoning 
ordinances which prevented the church from renting worship space 
in a commercial district.61 When the church applied to Middletown's 
Zoning Hearing Board for a variance, its application was denied.62 
Mter litigation began, the Court of Common Pleas for the county 
granted the variance, subject to conditions related to time of use and 
overflow parking provisions.63 The church brought suit against the 
township, alleging that the zoning scheme, which did not permit re-
ligious worship in any of its seventeen districts without subjecting that 
use to what it described as "onerous requirements, "64 violated the 
RLUIPA because the township's zoning laws had the effect of burden-
ing the plaintiff's religious expression.65 
As part of its defense, the Township argued that the RLUIPA was 
unconstitutional because Congress exceeded its Commerce Clause 
authority when it adopted the statute.66 Middletown argued that Con-
gress could not invoke its Commerce Clause authority to regulate relig-
ious exercise which it characterized as the "antithesis of commerce. "67 
The plaintiffs countered, however, that the "rental of property and use 
and development ofland substantially affect interstate commerce," and 
thus the zoning condition on the church's ability to lease worship space 
59 See 146 CONGo REc. E1563 (daily ed. Sept. 22. 2000) (statement of Rep. Canady). 
fIJ [d. 
61 Freedom Baptist Church v. Township of Middletown. 204 F. Supp. 2d 857, 859, 865-
66 (2002). 
62 [d. at 859. 
63 [d. 
64 In order to obtain a conditional use permit for religious worship, the town required 
applicants to provide adequate parking and a minimum lot size of 5 acres, a requirement 
that the Church argued made it nearly impossible for any new churches to locate within 
the Township. See id. 
65 [d. 
66 [d. at 865. 
67 Freedom Baptist Church, 204 F. Supp. 2d at 866. But see supra text accompanying note 
59. 
2004] The Utility and Efficacy of the RLUIPA 733 
constituted a significant burden on the plaintiffs religious exercise, 
thereby triggering the RLUIPA's Commerce Clause provision.68 
The court agreed with the plaintiffs, holding that "insofar as state 
or local authorities 'substantially burden' the economic activity of relig-
ious organizations, Congress has ample authority to act under the 
commerce clause. "69 The court distinguished the RLUIPA from the 
statutes the Supreme Court had held violated the Commerce Clause in 
United States v. Morrison 70 and United States v. Lopez, 71 because in those 
cases Congress sought to regulate criminal activity.72 The court further 
reasoned that, despite the fact that zoning and land use regulations are 
traditionally local matters, Congress retained its broad authority to 
regulate the aggregate effects of intrastate commerce on the nation 
under the standard set forth in Wickard v. Filburn,73 the essen tial hold-
ing of which survived the Supreme Court's analysis in Morrison.74 
There is scholarly disagreement about whether or not the RLUIPA 
satisfies the requirements of judicial analysis under the Commerce 
Clause, and much of the debate turns on how broadly one defines free 
exercise.75 For those whose concept of free exercise includes obtaining 
a space to worship, the RLUIPA's Commerce Clause-based jurisdic-
tional element would easily be satisfied.76 Storzer and Picarello suggest 
68 Id. 
69 Id. at 867-68 (internal citations omitted). 
70 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (determining the constitutionality of the Violence Against 
Women Act). 
71 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (determining the constitutionality of the Guns Free School 
Zone Act). 
72 Freedom Baptist Church, 204 F. Supp. 2d at 866-67 (stating that the criminal nature of 
conduct was central to the Court's determination in Morrison). 
73 317 U.S. III (1942) (holding that the Court could consider the effect of discrete 
commercial activities in the aggregate on interstate commerce). See also Westchester Day 
Sch. v. ViiI. of Mamaroneck, 280 F. Supp. 2d 230, 238 (S.D.N.Y 2003) (holding that the 
RLUIPA does not violate the commerce clause, in part, because religious organizations 
"facilitate the interchange of ideas, goods and services across a religious community that 
may span multiple states, as well as between that community and the outside world. This is 
paradigmatic 'commerce.'") (quoting U.S. v. Ballinger, 312 F.3d 1264, 1283 (11th Cir. 
2002). 
74 204 F. Supp. 2d at 867 nn.12 & 14 (discussing the Supreme Court's Morrison hold-
ing). 
75 Compare Roman P. Storzer & An thony R. Picarello, Jr., The Religious Land Use and In-
stitutionalized Persons Act of 2000; A Constitutional &sponse to Unconstitutional Zoning Practices, 
9 GEO. MASON L. REv. 929,952-53 (2001) (finding that the RLUIPA falls within Congress's 
Commerce Clause power), with Evan M. Shapiro, Note, The Religious Land Use and Institu-
tionalized Persons Act; An Analysis Under the Commerce Clause, 76 WASIL L. REv. 1255, 1278 
(2001) (finding that the RLUIPA is an unconstitutional use of Congress's Commerce 
Clause power). 
76 See Storzer & Picarello, supra note 74, at 953. 
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that permitting denials, like the one at issue in Freedom Baptist Church, 
stifle .the economic activity surrounding a building project: "employing 
construction workers, purchasing and transporting building materials 
and supplies, raising and transferring funds, and entering contracts. "77 
In many cases, religious organizations come into contact (and conflict) 
with land use regulations when they begin a project like constructing a 
place to meet.78 The process of this construction is necessarily eco-
nomic because it involves the purchase of both goods and services.79 
Furthermore, the argument reasonably extends to capture out of state 
activities as the project of constructing a new building is generally not 
confined to just the state or community where the religious organiza-
tion is located, as goods and services are often imported from out of 
state.so Thus, Storzer and Picarello assert that the RLUIPA's validity un-
der the Commerce Clause is easily established.81 
On the other hand, those who place the RLUIPA in the context of 
the Supreme Court's recent decisions in Morrison and Lopez, find that 
the statute fails to satisfY the command that Congress use its Commerce 
Clause power solely to regulate activities that are economic in nature 
and that have a substantial effect on interstate commerce.82 Rather 
than focusing on the activities involved in securing a place to worship, 
Evan M. Shapiro argues that "land use regulation does not constitute 
an economic enterprise or a commercial transaction."83 In making such 
a claim, he relies on the factors set forth by the Supreme Court in Mor-
rison and Lopez; (1) Congress's own finding that the regulated activity 
affects interstate commerce; (2) the strength of the nexus between the 
77Id. 
78 See id. 
79 See id.; see also Cottonwood Christian Ctr. v. Cypress Redevelopment Agency, 218 
F. Supp. 2d 1203, 1221-22 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (Explaining that religious congregations par-
ticipate in commerce both during and after construction of a building project.) 
Id. 
[T] he use of the church once it is constructed will affect commerce. [The 
church] will employ ministers, maintenance personnel, and daycare center 
workers. [The congregation] will use its church to transmit a televised minis-
try and hold national religious conferences. Furthermore, the bookstore will 
have employees and will regularly obtain merchandise for resale. All of these 
activities affect commerce. 
80 See Storzer & Picarello, supra note 74, at 953. 
81 See id. 
82 See Shapiro, supra note 75, at 1279; Ada-Marie Walsh, Note, Religious Land Use and In-
stitutionalized Persons Act of 2000: Unconstitutional and Unnecessary, 10 WM. & MARY BILL Rrs. 
J. 189,201 (2001). 
83 Shapiro, supra note 75, at 1278. 
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regulated activity and interstate commerce; and (3) the absence of a 
jurisdictional element in the statute itself.84 Shapiro also argues that, 
although the congressional record was replete with evidence of the in-
volvement of religious organizations in zoning disputes, these findings 
do not automatically point to the economic impact of such land use 
regulation.85 He claims that the RLUIPA requires a court to make too 
many inferences in connecting land use regulation as applied to relig-
ious exercise and interstate commerce.86 Finally, he argues that the 
RLUIPA'sjurisdictional element is ineffective because it leaves plaintiffs 
little choice but to use vague, speculative data to prove that the land use 
regulation in question, as applied to their religious expression, has a 
negative effect on interstate commerce.87 
C. Congressional Authority Under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment 
The third potential source of Congress's authority to enact the 
RLUIPA is the power granted to it under Section Five of the Four-
teenth Amendment to enforce the laws of the United States; in this 
case, the First Amendment.88 Section (a) (2) (C) of the Act provides 
that the RLUIPA applies to any case in which a "substantial burden is 
imposed in the implementation of a land use regulation or system of 
land use regulations, under which a government makes, or has in 
place formal or informal procedures or practices that permit the gov-
ernment to make, individualized assessments of the proposed uses for 
the property involved. "89 The bill's drafters asserted that the RLUIPA 
enforces the First Amendment, and particularly the Free Exercise 
Clause, as it has been interpreted by the Supreme Court.90 The ability 
84 [d. at 1282-83; see also Walsh, supra note 82, at 208. 
86 Shapiro, supra note 75, at 1283. 
86 [d. at 1285. 
87 [d. at 1287. 
88 146 CONGo REC. E1563 (dailyed. Sept. 22, 2000) (statement of Rep. Canady); 146 
CONGo REc. S7775 (daily ed. July 27, 2000) (joint statement of Sen. Hatch and Sen. Ken-
nedy). 
89 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a) (2) (C) (2000) (emphasis added). A prima facie case under the 
statute requires a plaintiff to show that the land use regulation at issue: "1) imposes a sub-
stantial burden; 2) on the 'religious exercise;' 3) of a person, institution, or assembly." 
Grace United Methodist Church V. City of Cheyenne, 235 F. Supp. 2d 1186, 1194 (D. Wyo. 
2002). At that point, the defendant municipality or state has the burden of proving that 
the regulation: 1) furthers a compelling governmental interest; 2) by the least restrictive 
means. [d. 
90 146 CONGo REc. S7775 (daily ed. July 27, 2000) (joint statement of Sen. Hatch and 
Sen. Kennedy) (citing Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. V. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 
520 (1993) and Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 884 (1990) 
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of Congress to ground its authority in Section Five is most relevant to 
this portion of the RLUIPA concerning individualized assessments, 
for it was, in part, through these two words that the Supreme Court 
distinguished the holding in Sherbert from the facts of Smith.91 
The RLUIPA's language and structure also reflect Congress's sen-
sitivity to the Court's holding in City of Boerne.92 By limiting the 
RLUIPA substantively, to those regulations that govern land use and 
institutionalized persons and that affect religious exercise, and proce-
durally, to only those laws that allow the government to make an indi-
vidualized assessment, Congress has attempted to construct a statute 
that is both congruent and proportional and that will survive the Su-
preme Court's careful scrutiny.93 
The court in Freedom Baptist Church addressed this concern di-
rectly.94 There, the court examined the RLUIPA's relationship to 
Congress's Section Five powers by addressing two related issues.95 
First, the court considered whether the RLUIPA truly was a 
codification of the Supreme Court's free exercise jurisprudence-in 
other words, does the RLUIPA square with the Court's decision in 
Smith?96 Second, the Freedom Baptist Church court addressed the issue 
of congruence and proportionality; that is to say, does the RLUIPA 
avoid the infirmities which sunk the RFRA in City of Boerne?97 
The court first determined that the Sherbert standard for applying 
strict scrutiny in free exercise cases that challenged laws imposing in-
dividualized assessments survived the Supreme Court's decision in 
Smith.98 This finding was based on the Supreme Court's own language 
in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah,99 where it ex-
plained Smith as standing for the proposition that where government 
allows for individual exemptions from general laws, it may not refuse 
to provide such exemptions to persons who articulate a religiously 
for the proposition that, "[w]here government makes such individualized assessments, 
permitting some uses and excluding others, it cannot exclude religious uses without com-
pelling justification"). 
91 See id; see also Smith, 494 V.S. at 884-85. 
92 See 146 CONGo REc. S7775 (daily ed. July 27, 2000) (joint statement of Sen. Hatch 
and Sen. Kennedy). 
93 See id. 
94 Freedom Baptist Church v. Township of Middletown, 204 F. Supp. 2d 857, 868-69 
(E.D. Pa. 2002). 
95 Id. at 868-74. 
96 Id. at 868-7l. 
97Id. at 872-74. 
98 Id. at 868. 
99 508 V.S. 520 (1993). 
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motivated reason for requesting an exemption.100 Thus, Congress's 
enactment of subsection (a) (2) (C) of the RLUIPA did nothing more 
than codify existing Supreme Court jurisprudence. lOl 
Second, the Freedom Baptist Church court found that, through the 
RLUIPA, Congress had not blurred the line between creating a rem-
edy to unconstitutional laws and defining constitutional rights.l02 By 
targeting only "low visibility decisions with the obvious-and, for 
Congress, unacceptable-concomitant risk of idiosyncratic applica-
tion," the RLUIPA conforms with the Supreme Court's decision in 
City of Boerne, satisfYing both the requirements for congruence and 
proportionality.l03 Thus, the Freedom Baptist Church court concluded 
that the "RLUIPA's land use provisions [were] constitutional on their 
face as applied to states and municipalities. "104 
Determining whether or not Congress exceeded its Section Five 
power in passing the RLUIPA depends, necessarily, upon one's inter-
pretation of the Supreme Court's holding in Smith. For example, Pro-
fessor Ira C. Lupu, has suggested that zoning schemes, because they are 
"characterized by a high degree of discretion" do not fit within the 
primary holding of Smith at all, instead falling within Smith's own excep-
tion for systems of individualized assessment. One court recently 
agreed with Professor Lupu's assessment. 105 In Castle Hills First Baptist 
Church v. City of Castle Hills,106 a court upheld RLUIPA's constitutionality 
as a valid exercise of Congress's Section Five power.107 "Zoning, and the 
100 Freedom Baptist Church, 204 F. Supp. 2d at 869 (citing, with approval, Church of the 
Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993)). 
101Id. 
102 See id. at 872. 
103Id. at 873-74. 
104Id. at 874. 
105 Ira C. Lupu, The Case Against Legislative Codification of Religious Liberty, 21 CAR-
DOZO L. REV. 565, 573 (1992). 
106 2004 WL 546792, *7 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 17,2004). 
107 Id. In this recent case, a local church claimed that the city's denial of two special 
use permits-one to build a parking lot and one to alter the use of a top story church 
building-violated its rights under the First Amendment, the RLUIPA, and the Texas Re-
ligious Freedom Restoration Act. Id. at 2. But see Elsinore Christian CtT. v. City of Lake Elsi-
nore, 291 F. Supp. 2d 1083, 1098 (C.D. Cal. 2003), where the court states that: 
Land use permitting is not an analogous case. In determining whether to is-
sue a zoning permit, municipal authorities do not decide whether to exempt 
a proposed user from an applicable law, but rather whether the general law 
applies to the facts before it. In this case, for instance, no users are "exempt" 
from the C-1 zoning rules. Rather, certain commercial users may locate in C-1 
zones as a matter of right, while non-commercial users, including churches, 
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special use permit application process specifically, inherently depend 
upon a system of individualized assessmen t. Moreover, courts have al-
ready recognized that land use regulations that require individualized 
assessment fall within the scope of the remaining strict scrutiny treat-
ment left in the wake of Smith and Hialeah. "108 The Castle Hills court's 
analysis underscores the importance of the statutory language regard-
ing individualized assessments to RLUIPA's constitutionality}09 
On the other hand, at least one federal court has held that the 
RLUIPA is unconstitutional because it exceeds the scope of congres-
sional authority under Section Five. llo In Elsinore Christian Center v. City 
of Lake Elsinore, the plaintiffs, the church, and one of its members, 
brought suit against the city alleging a violation of the RLUIPA for the 
city's failure to grant the church a conditional use permit to operate a 
church in a commercially zoned, blighted area of the city.lll The Elsi-
nore court first evaluated the church's claim under the statute and 
found that, because of the Act's definitional language, the city's fail-
ure to demonstrate that its decision was "in furtherance" of a compel-
ling interest, and the city's failure to use the least restrictive means to 
advance its interest, its denial of a conditional use permit violated the 
RLUIPA.ll2 In part, because of its statutory analysis, the Elsinore court 
found that the RLUIPA was unconstitutional. ll3 "It is the Act's explicit 
redefinition of 'religious exercise' that effects a manifest change in 
the analysis. Because use ofland is 'religious exercise' under RLUIPA, 
there can be no doubt that the City's action denying use of the Sub-
ject Property is a 'substantial burden' ofthat use. "114 
Id. 
must seek a permit. Thus, the Church is simply subject to the same permit-
ting rules as all other users. 
108 Castle Hills First Baptist Church, 2004 WL 546792 at *15. 
\09 See id. 
110 Elsinore, 291 F. Supp. 2d at 1103. 
111 Id. at 1085-86. 
112 Id. at 1091,1094-95. The City offered several justifications for denying the church a 
permit: maintaining a needed service (the space's current tenant was a discount grocery 
store in a low-income neighborhood); preventing loss of property tax revenue; potential 
paucity of adequate on-site parking for the church's congregation; and curbing urban 
blight by continuing to support a grocery store and provide local jobs. Id. at 1093. The 
court determined that maintenance of tax revenue was not a compelling interest. Id. "The 
maintenance of property tax revenue is a potentially pretextual basis for decision-making 
that appears to have been a specific target ofRLUIPA.· Id. 
113 See id. at 109!. 
114 Id. 
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In ruling that the RLUIPA exceeds congressional power under 
Section Five, the Elsinore court found that Congress misinterpreted the 
Supreme Court's free exercise jurisprudence since the Smith ruling. 115 
"Rather than codifYing precedent, RLUIPA mandates a sea change in 
the relevant standard of review."116 Unlike the RLUIPA, the Elsinore 
court explained, existing Supreme Court doctrine does not equate "a 
burden on a religious assembly's use of land ... [with] a 'substantial 
burden' on central religious practice under the Free Exercise 
Clause."117 Because the denial of a permit, under traditional Supreme 
Court analysis, does not amount to a substantial burden on religious 
exercise, the rule of Sherbert does not apply to ordinary land use regu-
lation, the court held. 118 This distinction, the Elsinore court determined, 
was fatal to the constitutionality of the statute: "[b]ecause the Church's 
denial of the [conditional use permit] is not subject to strict scrutiny 
under Sherbert and its progeny, RLUIPA cannot be said to effect a 
simple' codification' of existing constitutional law. "119 
Additionally, some commentators argue that Congress exceeded 
its Section Five power in enacting the RLUIPA}20 For instance, Caro-
line Adams argues that the RLUIPA significantly expands the scope of 
the Supreme Court's Smith holding and will effectively increase the 
number and variety of land use cases where courts will enforce a 
compelling interest test.l21 The RLUIPA, she contends, forces zoning 
boards to make an assessment of the proposed uses for the property 
and to apply greater deference where that use is related to religious 
exercise.122 The proper understanding of Smith, she argues, is that 
government should only apply the kind of deference mandated in 
Sherbert when government's assessment of an individual claim involves 
an inquiry into the reasons for the relevant conduct.123 Thus, the 
RLUIPA expands the scope of free exercise jurisprudence by requir-
ing this type of individualized inquiry in situations where the appli-
115 See id. 1099. 
116 Elsinore, 291 F. Supp. 2d at 1099. 
117 Id. at 1098. 
118 See id. 
119Id. at 1099. 
120 Adams, supra note 5, at 2392. 
121 Id. at 2404, 2405; see also Walsh, supra note 82, at 197-99. 
122 Adams, supra note 5, at 2404. At least one court agrees: "RLUIPA's test places a vir-
tually insuperable barrier before states and municipalities attempting to justify actions 
that, far more often than not, are neither motivated by religious bigotry nor burdensome 
on central religious practice." Elsinore, 291 F. Supp. 2d at 1101. 
12! Id. 
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cants' motivations for requesting an exemption are not important to 
the decisionmaker's evaluation. 
Adams also argues that the RLUIPA fails the Supreme Court's 
command in City of Boerne that Congress's actions pursuant to Section 
Five be both congruent and proportional to the harm which the legis-
lation seeks to remedy.124 Mter a thorough review of the congressional 
record, she argues that Congress lacked sufficient evidence of a pat-
tern and practice of religious discrimination to justify the enactment 
of the RLUIPA.125 She argues that Congress relied on evidence made 
up, in large part, of flawed statistics and anecdotal evidence of relig-
ious discrimination.126 For example, Congress relied heavily on an 
outdated Brigham Young University study which found that minority 
religions were over-represented in zoning and land use disputes.127 
D. A Record of Avoidance: How Have Lower Courts Handled the 
Question of the RLUIPA 's Constitutionality? 
Only a handful of courts have had an opportunity to hear cases 
involving the land use aspect of the RLUIPA and to comment on the 
Act's constitutionality.128 In Hale 0 Kaula Church v. Maui Planning Com-
mission, a church alleged that the planning commission violated the 
RLUIPA and the First Amendment when the commission denied the 
church a special use permit to construct a building for religious wor-
ship on a parcel zoned for agriculture under the state of Hawaii's land 
124 ld. at 2392. 
125 ld. at 2393. 
1261d. 
127 ld. at 2397-400. Adams found that this study was outdated and that the study's 
methods failed to take into account the concentration of religious groups in a given geo-
graphical area in determining which religions were in the minority. See id.; see also Elsinore, 
291 F. Supp. 2d at 1100 ("In fact, the [congressional] hearing record consists of a relatively 
small number of anecdotal instances in which religious assemblies were dissatisfied with 
zoning decisions or regulations, few of which constitute state or municipal actions of a 
clearly unconstitutional character."). 
128 See, e.g., Castle Hills First Baptist Church v. City of Castle Hills, 2004 WL 546792 
(W.D. Tex. Mar. 17, 2004); Elsinore, 291 F. Supp. 2d at 1083 (C.D. Cal. 2003); Hale 0 Kaula 
Church v. Maui Planning Comm'n, 229 F. Supp. 2d 1056 (D. Haw. 2002); Murphy v. Zon-
ing Comm'n, 148 F. Supp. 2d 173 (D. Conn. 2001); see also Konikov v. Orange County, 
Florida, 302 F. Supp. 2d 1328, 1346 (M.D. Fla. 2004) ("In light of the Court's conclusion 
that no RLUIPA violation has been established, the Court need not reach the question of 
RLUIPA's constitutionality. "); Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of 
Latter-Day Saints v. City of W. Linn, 86 P.3d 1140 (Or. App. 2004) (ruling that a city's de-
nial of a conditional use permit to build a church meetinghouse in a residential area did 
not violate the RLUIPA and remanding the case to the local Land Use Board of Appeals 
without reaching the question of the RLUIPA's constitutionality.) 
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use classification system.l29 Plaintiffs asserted a facial challenge-that 
the RLUIPA invalidated the provisions of Hawaii's state land use laws as 
enforced through the local planning board-as well as a claim that the 
board's application of the zoning law violated the RLUIPA)30 The 
planning commission defended that the RLUIPA was constitutionally 
invalid. 131 Without addressing the issue ofthe RLUIPA's constitutionality, 
the court rejected both the plaintiffs' facial and as applied challenges.132 
First, rejecting the facial claim, the court held that the state's 
land use classification scheme did not violate the RLUIPA because the 
Hawaii law's placement of land into agricultural, rural, urban, and 
conservation districts did not discriminate against religious buildings 
or uses.133 Although the court conceded that Hawaii's facially neutral 
law of general applicability did include a system of individualized as-
sessments, the court reasoned that, because plaintiffs were treated on 
equal terms with other non-religious, non-agricultural land owners 
under the law, the statute did not violate the RLUIPA.134 
Second, the court held that the question of the RLUIPA's consti-
tutionality was mooted by the fact that existing Supreme Court doc-
trine required the court to use strict scrutiny to evaluate the planning 
commission's denial of the church's request for an exemption to the 
land use classification.135 Sidestepping the issue of the RLUIPA's con-
stitutionality, the court reasoned that the Supreme Court's holding in 
Smitlb--that ''where the State has in place a system of individualized 
exemptions, it may not refuse to extend that system to cases of 'relig-
ious hardship' without compelling reason"-required the court to use 
strict scrutiny, regardless of the demands of the RLUIPA.136 Sweeping 
aside the defendant's argument that the RLUIPA violated the Consti-
tution by exceeding the scope of Congress's Commerce Clause power 
as defined in Lopez, the court determined that both the RLUIPA's in-
clusion of a jurisdictional element as well as the Act's regulation of a 
narrow field of activity made the RLUIPA impervious to the defen-
dant's argument. 137 
129 Hale 0 Kaula Church, 229 F. Supp. 2d at 1059-60. 
130 See id. at 1069-70. 
131 Id. at 1064. 
132 See id. at 1070, 1074. 
133 Id. at 1070. 
134 Id. at 1070-71. 
135 Hale 0 Kaula Church, 229 F. Supp. 2d at 1072-73. 
136 Id. at 1073. 
137Id. at 1071-72. The court did seem to suggest, however, that it might have ruled dif-
ferently if the defendants had argued that the RLUIPA violated the Constitution because it 
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The Hale 0 Kaula court failed to reach the ultimate question of 
whether or not the planning commission's actions violated the church's 
religious exercise rights because the record lacked sufficient detail to 
address this issue.138 A year later, however, the same judge, in a parallel 
case, upheld the constitutionality of the RLUIPA139 At this point, the 
federal government had already intervened in Hale 0 Kaula Church to 
defend the statute. l40 Although the court indicated that there was new 
caselawon point, it concluded that none of this precedent was "truly 
binding. "141 Upholding the RLUIPA, the Maui court found: "[e]ven if 
. Congress went a little further in codifYing an extension of the 'indi-
vidualized assessments' doctrine from an unemployment benefits con-
text ... to a land use context, it acted with 'congruence and propor-
tionality' in codifYing strict scrutiny in this context. "142 
Another federal court in Illinois similarly dodged the question of 
the RLUIPA's constitutionality.l43 In G.L. U.B. v. City of Chicago, several 
religious groups who had experienced difficulty obtaining worship 
spaces in the city challenged Chicago'S zoning ordinances as violative 
of the RLUIPAl44 During the course of the litigation, the city had 
amended its zoning ordinances-which had not previously allowed 
for religious uses by right in any of its land use districts-and had 
thus, according to the court, removed any substantial burden on relig-
ious exercise and undermined the applicability of the RLUIPA145 Be-
cause the court held that the RLUIPA no longer applied to the facts 
in the case, it did not find it necessary to address the question of the 
Act's constitutional validity.l46 
In a third case, Murphy v. Zoning Commission, plaintiffs alleged that 
the town's zoning commission violated their First Amendment rights 
failed to conform to the Supreme Court's congruence and proportionality requirements 
for evaluating Commerce Clause challenges. See id. at 1073. In dicta, the court noted that 
even though it applied strict scrutiny in this case, "it [did not] necessarily mean that Con-
gress did not go too far in codifying strict scrutiny for all zoning or land use laws, or in 
codifying an interpretation and extension of the 'individualized assessments' doctrine (i.e., 
extending the doctrine from an unemployment benefits context as in Smith to all zoning 
contexts)." Id. 
158 Id. at 1074. 
159 United States v. Maui, 298 F. Supp. 2d 1010, 1016 (D. Haw. 2003). 
140 Id. 
HI Id. at 1014. 
142 Id. at 1016. 
145 SeeC.L.U.B. v. City of Chicago, 157 F. Supp. 2d 903, 917 (N.D. TIl. 2001). 
144 Id. at 905, 906. 
145Id. at 905--06,917. 
146Id. at 917. 
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and the RLUIPA when it ordered the plaintiffs to suspend weekly 
prayer meetings held in their home, as the regularly scheduled meet-
ings and subsequent parking overflow violated town zoning ordi-
nances.l47 In its decision granting the plaintiffs' motion for a prelimi-
nary injunction, the court declined to address the issue of the 
RLUIPA's constitutionality.l48 Although the defendants had articulated 
to the court that they intended to challenge the RLUIPA's constitu-
tional fitness, neither party had briefed the issue at the time of the 
hearing. 149 For the purposes of determining the plaintiffs likelihood of 
success on the merits-part of the court's analysis about whether or not 
to grant plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction-the court 
chose to presume the constitutional validity of the RLUIPA.150 
At this point, then, most courts have ruled that the RLUIPA does 
not violate the Constitution. There is significant scholarship, however, 
suggesting that if the question of the constitutionality of the RLUIPA 
ever reached the Supreme Court, it would be held unconstitutional. 
Nevertheless, until the Supreme Court can find, and decides to accept 
an appropriate case, the RLUIPA will likely be held constitutional by 
lower federal courts. 
III. ANALYSIS: EVEN IF THE RLUIPA CAN PASS CONSTITUTIONAL 
MUSTER, Is THE STATUTE BENEFICIAL? 
To date, most scholarship concerning the RLUIPA has focused 
primarily on the Act's constitutionality. An equally important ques-
tion, however, is whether or not the RLUIPA is a useful piece of legis-
lation. This is especially true if the statute's goal is to enhance the free 
exercise of religion in matters relating to land use. As this section will 
explain, there is legitimate concern on the part of some commenta-
tors that the RLUIPA will have the opposite of its intended effect, and 
will actually curb the ability of courts to protect free exercise in the 
land use context, as well as in other arenas.151 
As one commentator has suggested, and as at least one court has 
shown, there is reason to worry that both plaintiffs' attorneys and 
judges will overlook more creative avenues in the wake of legislation 
147 148 F. Supp. 2d 173, 177 (D. Conn. 2001). 
148 [d. at 187 n.13. 
149 [d. 
150 [d. 
151 See infra Part III.A. 
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like the RLUIPA, and freeze the development of free exercise juris-
prudence in its tracks. 152 
A careful look at the Supreme Court's treatment of free exercise 
in the years since Smith reveals at least two avenues left open by the 
Court for protecting religious free exercise: hybrid rights theory and 
schemes of individualized application}53 These two alternatives have 
considerable potential to alleviate some of Congress's concerns re-
garding the often difficult situations religious communities find 
themselves in as they attempt to navigate local land use schemes. 
A. The Risk of "Constitutional Atrophy" to Free Exercise jurisprudence 
At least one commentator has suggested that religious freedom 
legislation, like the RLUIPA, is undesirable because it may have the 
unintended consequence of "atrophy" of judicial development in the 
area of free exercise jurisprudence}54 Professor Lupu argues that re-
ligious liberty legislation like the RLUIPA (and the RFRA before it) 
will become a "lightning rod" for judicial attention and create the il-
lusion that the Free Exercise Clause is ineffectual in protecting relig-
ious freedom and undeserving of judicial examination.155 If courts 
expend most of their energy in this area on RLUIPA claims, ignoring 
traditional free exercise analysis, "the possibilities for new and creative 
approaches to free exercise adjudication are likely to shrink over time; 
and some pre-existing categories of free exercise protection ... may 
be diminished. "156 At the same time, Professor Lupu suggests that 
non-comprehensive religious liberty legislation, specifically in the 
land use context, is less likely to have such an affect on judicial devel-
opment of constitutional norms for the entire free exercise corpus}57 
His suggestion seems to be that, because this legislation is so focused 
on a subset of free exercise issues, it will not prevent judges from ap-
proaching other free exercise claims creatively.158 Still, it is unclear 
whether Professor Lupu is just less concerned about threats to free 
exercise in the land use context or whether he is willing to sacrifice 
152 See infra Part ill.D. 
153 See infra Part lV.B. 
154 Lupu, supra note 105, at 580. 
155 See id. 
156Id. (discussing the effects of the RLUlPA's predecessor, the RFRA). 
157 See id. at 581 (discussing a proposed California land use law). 
158 See id. at 580. 
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free exercise cases in the land use context in order to preserve the 
larger body of free exercise jurisprudence. 159 
B. After Smith, Is There Rnom for Judicial Creativity? 
Mter the Supreme Court's 1990 decision in Employment Division, 
Department of Human Resources v. Smith, many scholars and advocates of 
religious liberty suggested that the Smith decision was both a reversal 
of prior Supreme Court free exercise precedent and a danger to the 
future of religious liberty.1OO Three years after Smith, in Church of the 
Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, the Supreme Court sharp-
ened its free exercise jurisprudence while reaffirming Smith's essential 
holding}61 What is interesting about the case, however, is its treatment 
of Smith's mandate that neutral laws of general applicability receive 
only rational basis, rather than strict scrutiny review}62 
Lukumi involved several Florida city ordinances that prohibited 
religious animal sacrifice within the city limits and made the practice 
punishable by both fines and imprisonment.163 The legislation, which 
included exemptions for the commercial slaughter of animals raised 
for human consumption,164 was passed in response to the anticipated 
establishment of a Santeria165 community and church in the city}66 
Among the rituals practiced by San teria believers is the sacrifice of 
chickens, pigeons, doves, ducks, guinea pigs, goats, sheep, and tur-
tles.167 In most instances, these animals are eaten after the ritual is 
performed}68 Upon enactment of the city's new ordinances, the 
Church filed an action alleging violations of its rights under the Free 
Exercise Clause of the First Amendment and sought a declaratory 
judgment as well as injunctive and monetary relief}69 
159 See id. at 58l. 
160 See, e.g., Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 
577-78 (1993) (Blackmun,j. concurring). 
161 Id. at 531-32,545. 
162 See id. at 524. 
16! Id. at 527, 528. 
164 Id. 
165 The Santeria religion is a fusion of western African religious practice with Roman 
Catholicism, developed in Cuba during the Nineteenth century when African slaves were 
brought to the island. Id. at 524. 
166 Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc., 508 U.S. at 526-27. 
167 Id. at 525. 
168 Id. 
169 Id. at 528. 
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Before analyzing the ordinance at issue in the case, the Lukumi 
Cour~ made the threshold determination that the record sufficiently 
demonstrated that animal sacrifice was an integral element of Santeria 
religious belief and merited First Amendmen t protection. 170 The Court 
then described the level of scrutiny that it would apply to the law; it be-
gan by restating the holding of Smith, that neutral laws of general appli-
cability are not subject to analysis under strict scrutiny, even when the 
effect is to burden religious expression. l7l IT a law cannot meet these 
two requirements-neutrality and general applicability-the Court fur-
ther explained that it must be analyzed under strict scrutiny. 172 
The Lukumi Court found that the law failed to meet these re-
quirements.173 Relying on Smith, the Court held that when "the object 
of a law is to infringe upon or restrict practices because of their relig-
ious motivation, the law is not neutral. "174 In determining the object 
of the city's ordinances, the Court examined three relevant factors: 
the text of the ordinance,175 the adverse impact of the ordinance,l76 
and the historical background ofthe law's passage.177 
In terms of the text, the Lukumi Court stressed that facial neutral-
ity of the statute is not, by itself, determinative of neutrality for the 
purposes of free exercise analysis,l7s The language of the city's stat-
utes, the Court found, suggested that the ordinances' true object was 
to target Santeria practice,l79 One of the ordinances in question be-
gan with the statement that "citizens of the City of Hialeah have ex-
pressed their concern that certain religions may propose to engage in 
practices which are inconsistent with public morals, peace or 
safety. "ISO The Court, however, did not end its analysis of the neutrality 
elemen t there. lSI 
The Lukumi Court next examined the adverse impact of the city's 
ordinances, holding that, although adverse impact alone is not 
sufficient to prove a law's object, the "effect of a law in its real opera-
170Id. at 53l. 
171 Id. 
172 Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc., 508 U.S. at 531-32. 
mId. at 542. 
174Id. at 533. 
175Id. at 533-34. 
176Id. at 535. 
177 Id. at 540. 
178 Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc., 508 U.S. at 533-34. 
179Id. at 534-35. 
ISO Id. at 535. 
181 See id. 
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tion is strong evidence of its object. "182 The Court went on to find that 
the City of Hialeah's ordinances prohibiting ritual sacrifice of animals 
amounted to "religious gerrymandering. "183 Because the ordinances 
incorporated a number of exemptions within their language-for ex-
ample, exemptions for kosher slaughter, hunting, and slaughter by 
licensed food establishments-the Court found it nearly impossible to 
draw any conclusion other than an object to target Santeria religious 
practice. 184 
Finally, the Court also examined the circumstances surrounding 
the passage ofthe city's several ordinances. l85 Borrowing analysis from 
the decision in Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development 
Corp.,I86 the Lukumi Court held that a law's historical background is 
significant to the determination of the law's object.187 Among the fac-
tors relevant to this part of the Court's analysis are the "specific series 
of events leading to the enactment [of the] official policy in question, 
and the legislative or administrative history, including statements 
made by the decision making body. "188 Upon examining the record 
before it, which included statements made by city council members 
indicating that the council's goal was to prevent the Santeria church 
from opening in the City of Hialeah, the Court concluded that the 
ordinances were enacted "because of, not merely in spite of," their 
ability to prevent Santeria religious practice. l89 
Because the Court determined that the object of the city's several 
ordinances was to burden religious exercise, it found that the laws 
were not neutral and therefore applied strict scrutiny.190 The Lukumi 
Court found that the burden of the city's ordinances fell almost en-
tirely on the free exercise of practitioners of the Santeria religion.191 
The Court also found that, although the city had an interest in pre-
venting animal cruelty, it could have achieved this goal through nar-
rower means. 192 Before holding that the city's ordinances violated the 
182 Id. 
IS!! Id. 
184 Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc., 508 U.S. at 536. 
185 See id. at 540. 
186 429 U.S. 252, 266 (1977) (involving an equal protection challenge to city zoning 
laws). 
187 Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc., 508 U.S. at 540. 
188 Id. 
189 Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
190 Id. at 536-39. 
191 Id. at 536. 
192 Id. at 539. 
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First Amendment rights of members of the Lukumi church, the Court 
briefly noted that there was no need to determine the precise stan-
dard by which it should evaluate whether a statute fulfilled the re-
quirement of general applicability}93 Because the ordinances in-
volved, in the Court's opinion, fell so far "below the minimum 
standard necessary to protect First Amendment rights," there was no 
need to analyze them against this element.194 
What is interesting about the Court's analysis in Church oj the Lu-
kumi Bablu Aye is that it simultaneously reasserts the holding in Smith 
while pushing the Court to look more closely at the effects of the law in 
question before determining which level of scrutiny to use}95 It seems 
likely, from the Court's own analysis, that the text of the city's ordi-
nances itself was enough to prove that the ordinances were not neu-
tral. l96 But the Court went further and examined both the effects of the 
ordinances on religious expression as well as the historical context of 
their passage beJore determining what level of scrutiny to apply.197 While 
the Lukumi Court's approach is a tempered one-the Court makes 
clear that the adverse impact of a law on religious expression is not by 
itself enough to find that the object of the law is to restrict free exer-
cise-it is in tension with the majority opinion in Smith.t98 
In his majority opinion in Smith, Justice Scalia dismissed the ar-
gument set forth in Justice O'Connor's concurrence that all laws that 
have the effect of burdening the free exercise of religion should be 
subject to analysis under strict scrutiny.t99 Comparing the Court's pro-
tection of religious expression under the First Amendment to its 
treatment of race under the Equal Protection Clause, Justice Scalia 
stated that the Court has declined to hold that "race-neutral laws that 
have the effect of disproportionately disadvantaging a particular racial 
group do not thereby become subject to compelling-interest analysis 
under the Equal Protection Clause [of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment]. "200 Scalia declined to follow O'Connor's suggestion that the 
Court adopt a burdensome effects test for free exercise cases, a theory 
195 See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc., 508 U.S. at 543. 
194 See id. at 543-44. 
195 See supra text accompanying notes 158-191. 
196 See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc., 508 U.S. at 535. 
197 See id. at 535, 540. 
198 See id. at 535; supra text accompanying notes 31-34. 
199 Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 886 n.3 (1990). 
200 See id. (citing Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976)). 
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which the Supreme Court has explicitly rejected for cases involving 
challenges under the Fourteenth Amendment.201 
Although the Lukumi Court's use of an adverse impact analysis, 
which is merely one part of another sub-component in the Court's neu-
trality analysis, does not amount to the same level of judicial sensitivity 
that Justice Scalia argued against in Smith, it does represent a slight de-
parture from that position.202 Furthermore, the weaving in of adverse 
impact analysis represents the kind of judicial creativity to which Profes-
sor Lupu refers.203 The Lukumi Court's analysis could have a significant 
impact on challenges to land use statutes and schemes, should lower 
courts choose to follow the Supreme Court's lead and look behind the 
statutes themselves to the circumstances surrounding their enactments. 
In many cases, local ordinances are updated more frequently than state 
or federal laws and are more likely to reflect the current mood and 
concerns of the relevant electorate. The result is that a record of the 
proposal and adoption of such ordinances may be rich with relevance 
in cases of alleged religious hostility. 
C. Hybrid Rights Theory: The Exception That Threatens to 
Swallow the Smith Rule 
Another opportunity for judicial creativity in the area of free ex-
ercise jurisprudence can be found in the Smith opinion itself.204 The 
Smith Court distinguished the facts in that case from earlier cases like 
Wisconsin v. Yodm205 by arguing that such earlier cases represented 
situations involving "hybrid" rights.206 
The only decisions in which we have held that the First 
Amendment bars application of a neutral, generally applica-
ble law to religiously motivated action have involved not the 
free exercise clause alone, but the free exercise clause in 
conjunction with other constitutional protections, such as 
201 See id. (citing Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976)). 
202 See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc., 508 U.S. at 535. 
203 See Lupu, supra note 105, at 580. 
204 See id. at 571. 
205 406 U.S. 205 (1972). In Yoder, the Supreme Court upheld a challenge by Amish 
parents that state compulsory school attendance laws, requiring that they send their chil-
dren to public schools, burdened their free exercise rights. See generally id. 
206 Smith, 494 U.S. at 882. 
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freedom of speech and of the press ... or the right of par-
ents ... to direct the education oftheir children .... 207 
This articulation of hybrid rights has led to considerable judicial activ-
ity in lower courts.208 
In one recent case, Tenafly Eruv Ass'n v. Borough of Tenafly, the 
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit indicated that the Supreme 
Court's articulation of a hybrid rights theory forced lower courts to be 
increasingly sensitive to challenges that implicate free exercise claims 
along with other constitutional rights.209 Tenafly Eruv Ass'n, involved 
the enforcement of a facially neutral city ordinance prohibiting indi-
viduals from affixing signs or other materials to publicly owned utility 
poles against an Orthodox Jewish community that violated the ordi-
nance for religiously motivated reasons.210 With the assistance of the 
local cable company, the Tenafly Eruv Association attached thin, black 
strips of plastic, known as lechis, vertically to the city's utility poles in 
order to construct an eruv within the city.211 An eruv is a symbolic de-
marcation of an area which facilitates the ability of Orthodox Jews to 
travel to synagogue on the Sabbath.212 Although their faith prevents 
them from pushing or carrying objects outside of their homes on the 
Sabbath, Orthodox Jews may engage in such activity within the spatial 
boundaries of an eruV.213 Upon learning of the association's actions, 
the city demanded the removal of the lechis marking off the eruv, al-
though it had failed to previously enforce this ordinance against other 
residents who engaged in similar, but secularly motivated, activities.214 
The association sued the borough, asserting that the ordinance vio-
lated both its free exercise and free speech rights.215 
The Appeals Court found that the association could not sustain its 
claim that the ordinance infringed on its free speech rights.216 The as-
sociation argued that the lechis that marked the eruv's boundaries were 
so innocuous that even members of the Tenafly Orthodox community 
207 [d. at 881. 
208 See Lupu, supra note 105, at 571; see also supra text accompanying notes 206-228. 
209 See 309 F.3d 144, 163 n.20 (3d Cir. 2002). 
210 Seeid. at 151. 
2JI [d. at 152. 
212 [d. 
215 [d. 
214 [d. at 151 (stating that residents of Tenafly had previously attached directions to lo-
cal churches, signs advertising missing pets, house number signs, Christmas holiday deco-
rations, and orange ribbons to the utility poles without having the ordinance enforced). 
215 Tenafly Eruv Ass'n, 309 F.3d at 151. 
216 [d. at 165. 
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would not be able to recognize them for what they were; rather, knowl-
edge of the eruv and its boundaries would be passed by word of 
mouth. 217 Because of this, the court determined that the act of affixing 
lechis to the utility poles was not "sufficiently imbued with elements of 
communication to be deemed expressive conduct" worthy of protec-
tion under free speech jurisprudence.218 The court concluded that, in 
the absence of evidence that such demarcations convey an "attitude or 
belief," geographical boundary lines, like the eruv or fences and walls, 
were not expression protected by the First Arnendmen t. 219 
In reaching this holding, the Tenafly Eruv court was obviously 
concerned with the implications of making it easier for plaintiffs 
bringing free exercise claims to allege an infringement of hybrid 
rights.220 The court expressed concern that, by analyzing the con-
struction of an eruv under the Free Speech Clause, it would set a 
precedent that would easily allow plaintiffs and courts to side-step the 
essential holding of Smith.221 "Moreover, if solely the act of erecting a 
wall separating the interior of a building from the secular world con-
stituted 'speech,' every religious group that wanted to challenge a 
zoning regulation preventing them from constructing a house ofwor-
ship could raise a 'hybrid' rights claim triggering strict scrutiny. "222 
Commentators have expressed similar concerns that Smith's exemp-
tion for hybrid rights threatens to swallow the rule it creates.223 
Both the Courts of Appeals for the Ninth and Tenth Circuits have 
also directly addressed the issue of how hybrid rights challenges affect 
a court's analysis under Smith.224 In a case involving religious parents' 
desire to send their home-schooled child to public school part-time to 
take science and foreign language courses, the Tenth Circuit Court of 
Appeals held that Smith's hybrid rights theory "at least requires a col-
217 [d. at 162. 
218 [d. at 161-62 (internal quotations omitted). 
219 [d. at 163. 
220 [d. 
221 See Tenafly Eruv Ass'n, 309 F.3d at 163. 
222 [d. 
22g E.g., Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 567 
(1993) (Souter,]. concurring) ("If a hybrid claim is simply one in which another constitu-
tional right is implicated, then the hybrid exception would probably be so vast as to swal-
low the Smith rule .... "); see also Castle Hills First Baptist Church v. City of Castle Hills, 
2004 WL 546792, *7, *15 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 17, 2004) ("A plaintiff cannot establish a hybrid 
rights claim merely by combining a substantial free exercise claim with tenuous claims and 
mere allegations of violations of other rights."). 
224 See Miller v. Reed, 176 F.3d 1202, 1208 (9th Cir. 1999); Swanson v. Guthrie Indep. 
Sch. Dist. No. 1-L, 135 F.3d 694, 700 (10th Cir. 1998). 
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orable showing of infringement of recognized and specific constitu-
tional rights, rather than the mere invocation of a general right such 
as the right to control the education of one's child. "225 Thus the court 
suggested that, in order for a hybrid rights theory to apply, the plain-
tiff must make a showing that both constitutional claims have a 
chance at success on the merits.226 What is unclear from the court's 
language, however, is whether so-called "general rights," like the right 
of parents to control their child's education and up-bringing, will ever 
qualify for hybrid rights theory.227 This is curious given Scalia's own 
invocation of this same right-the right to direct the education of 
one's children, as articulated in both Wisconsin v. Yoder and Pierce v. 
Society of Sisters, in first articulating the hybrid rights theory in Smith.228 
A similar, but slightly broader, reading of the hybrid rights theory 
is offered by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Miller v. Reed, a case 
involving a claim that the California Department of Motor Vehicle's 
requirement that applicants provide their social security number to re-
new a driver's license violated both plaintiffs free exercise of religion 
and right to interstate trave1. 229 The Miller court held that a claim of a 
hybrid rights violation required more than a "meritless claim of the vio-
lation of another alleged fundamental right or a claim of an alleged 
violation of a non-fundamental or non-existent right. "230 Thus the Miller 
court seems to suggest that, in order to qualify for the benefit of a hy-
brid rights analysis, the plaintiffs second claim must have merit and 
must be a claim of violation of a fundamental or existing right.231 
D. Does the RLUIPA Hinder or Enhance These Opportunities 
for Judicial Creativity? 
The RLUIPA has the potential to both enhance and to hinder op-
portunities for judicial creativity in free exercise jurisprudence. Thus 
far, courts have reacted to the Act in a manner which fails to consider 
other avenues for protecting religious free exercise. MUlphy v. Zoning 
Commission of the Town of New Milford,232 is one example of a missed op-
portunity to further explore the hybrid rights exemption created by 
225 Swanson, 135 F.3d at 700. 
226 See id. 
227 See id. 
228 See Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881-82 (1990). 
229 See Miller, 176 F.3d at 1204. 
230 Id. at 1208. 
231 See id. 
232 148 F. Supp. 2d 173 (D. Conn. 2001). 
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Smith. As explained above, Murphy involved a challenge that a town zon-
ing conunission violated the plaint.ifrs First Amendment rights and the 
RLUIPA when it ordered the plaintiffs to suspend weekly prayer meet-
ings held in their home, as the regularly scheduled meetings and sub-
sequent parking over-flow violated town zoning ordinances.233 Plaintiffs 
alleged that the town had violated both their right to free exercise of 
religion and their right to assembly.234 Arguably, the plaintiffs claims 
provided an excellent opportunity for the court to address hybrid 
rights theory. Plaintiff Murphy's son testified that he and his father 
could not comply with the town's request that they limit their weekly 
prayer meetings to twenty-five people because "part of the purpose of 
the meetings was to help people in need and, if a twenty-sixth person 
needed the help of the prayer group, he did not want to turn that per-
son away. "235 Such a claim appears to be a perfect confluence of fun-
damental rights under the Smith hybrid rights theory. 
Although the Murphy court did apply strict scrutiny to the plain-
tiffs claim, the court did so solely on the grounds that the RLUIPA re-
quired it.236 Mter the court determined that the town's enforcement of 
the zoning ordinance created a substantial burden on the plaintiffs 
free exercise of religion, the RLUIPA required it to apply strict scrutiny 
and determine whether the town's application of the ordinance repre-
sented a compelling interest, achieved through the least restrictive 
means.237 Although the court ultimately granted the plaintiffs their re-
quest for a preliminary injunction, it did so by looking solely at the 
merits of the RLUIPA claim, ignoring the other constitutional chal-
lenges entirely.238 This treatment of the plaintiffs claims seems to un-
derscore Professor Lupu's point about judicial atrophy.239 The 
RLUIPA's drafters were concerned about making sure the holding in 
Smith did not close the doors to religious free exercise in the area of 
land use disputes.240 Thus, it follows that the RLUIPA's supporters 
should want to see more judicial exploration of areas of free exercise 
255 See supra notes 148-150 and accompanying text. 
254 Murphy, 148 F. Supp. 2d at 175. 
255 Id. at 189. 
256 See id. at 189-90. 
257Id. 
258 Id. at 190-91. 
259 See supra Part ill.A. 
240 See 146 CONGo REc. S7774 (daily ed. July 27, 2000) (joint statement of Sen. Hatch 
and Sen. Kennedy) ("Churches in general, and new, small, or unfamiliar churches in par-
ticular, are frequently discriminated against on the face of zoning codes and also in the 
highly individualized and discretionary processes of land use regulation."). 
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doctrine left open to analysis under strict scrutiny, such as hybrid rights 
theory. The concern seems very real, however, that if judges can find 
for plaintiffs who assert that government has burdened a hybrid right 
involving free exercise under RLUIPA, they will follow the course of the 
Murphy court and ignore the possibility of evaluating these claims with 
strict scrutiny on constitutional grounds alone. 
Whether or not the RLUIPA stifles judicial creativity is an impor-
tant question because it is connected to the on-going debate about 
the most effective way to protect individual rights-through judicial 
or legislative action. For those, like Professor Lupu, who are con-
cerned with the judicial development and protection of rights, courts' 
unwillingness to see past the main holding of Smith is troubling, and, 
one might argue, this judicial unwillingness is due to the fact that 
statutes like the RLUIPA are blocking their view.241 
Although the Tenafly Eruv case did not involve a RLUIPA claim, 
the plaintiffs in that case did challenge the application of a local mu-
nicipal ordinance, similar to most land use ordinances.242 There, the 
court was unwilling to allow the plaintiffs to assert both a free exercise 
and a free speech claim, and seemed particularly concerned about 
the effect of a hybrid rights challenge on the level of scrutiny re-
quired.243 One could argue that the court gave the Eruv Association's 
speech claim short shrift in order to avoid a hybrid rights analysis 
which, according to the holding of Smith, would require the court to 
evaluate the plaintiff's claim using strict scrutiny.244 Such a result 
would certainly confirm Professor Lupu's worst anxieties about a de-
cline in judicial creativity, as the Tenafly Eruv court seemed reluctant 
to take on the issue of hybrid rights, even when there was no religious 
liberty legislation involved.245 Alternatively, the RLUIPA may not be as 
problematic as Professor Lupu and other commentators portend be-
cause it is so narrowly focused on issues of free exercise in the land 
241 See e.g., Elsinore Christian Ctr. v. City of Lake Elsinore, 291 F. Supp. 2d 1083, 1087 
(C.D. Cal. 2003). Plaintiffs brought claims alleging that the city's denial of a conditional 
use permit violated the RLUIPA, the California state constitution, and the United States 
Constitution. Id. Because "[a] fundamental and long-standing principle of judicial re-
straint requires that courts avoid reaching constitutional questions in advance of the ne-
cessity of deciding them,· the court asked the parties to initially focus their efforts on the 
plaintiff's RLUIPA claim alone. Id. (quoting Lyng v. N.W. Indian Cemetary Protective 
Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 445 (1988». 
242 See Tenafly Eruv Ass'n v. Borough of Tenafly, 309 F.3d 144, 151 (2002). 
243 See id. at 163. 
244 Id. at 163; see Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 882 
(1990). 
245 See discussion, supra Part III.A. 
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use and institutionalized persons contexts.246 One way to examine this 
concern more closely is through the lens of recent RLUIPA litigation. 
Supporters of the RLUIPA may argue that the statute will not have 
the effect of stalling judicial creativity in the area of free exercise juris-
prudence because land use cases will only account for one segment of 
all cases involving challenges under the First Amendment. This is a 
difficult argument to make, however, because of the assertion on the 
part of the RLUIPA's drafters that enacting a statute targeting burdens 
on free exercise in the land use arena was essential since it was in this 
field where the most egregious violations of religious liberty occur.247 H 
this is in fact the case, and the majority of free exercise challenges do 
occur in the land use context, then it seems especially important that 
judges not ignore opportunities for creativity in this realm. 
IV. COMMENT: RLUIPA's EFFECT ON THE STRUGGLE FOR AND 
ATTAINMENT OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 
The legislative history of the RLUIPA reveals that the statute is 
the result of considerable compromise on the part of its diverse sup-
porters.248 Because the RLUIPA is still young and has yet to be the 
subject of extensive litigation, it is difficult to determine whether the 
compromises that were necessary to the statute's passage will have the 
effect of preventing some from fully realizing the Act's promise to 
protect free exercise from the burdens of local land use regulation. 
Similarly, questions remain as to whether the RLUIPA truly achieves a 
level of protection for religious freedom that was unavailable under 
the Supreme Court's free exercise jurisprudence. 
A. Is Legislation the Correct Tool to Address the Problem 
of Religious Intolerance1 
Related to the issue of the RLUIPA's effect on judicial considera-
tion of free exercise claims is the issue of the RLUIPA's effect on the 
politics surrounding efforts to ensure the protection of religious prac-
tice and expression through the legislative process. 
The RLUIPA's detractors have been quick to suggest that, in ad-
dition to the Act's alleged unconstitutionality, it has the potential to 
create a new religious super-class, armed with the ability to avoid neu-
246 See discussion, supra Part m.A. 
247 See id. 
248 See supra notes 4-5 and accompanying text. 
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tral laws designed to protect the health, safety, and welfare of all 
members of society.249 An examination of the RLUIPA's predecessor, 
the RFRA, however, indicates that such a characterization of the 
newer law may be inaccurate and undeserved.250 Professor Lupu, who 
was among the RFRA's opponents, surveyed the statute's win-loss rec-
ord after the Supreme Court's decision in City oj Boerne and con-
cluded that the RFRA did little to increase the success rate of plaintiffs 
involved in free exercise litigation.251 He argues that the combination 
of the RFRA's "vague formula and judicial unwillingness to construe 
the statute in ways which would give it real bite." contributed to this 
effect.252 The results under the RFRA, Professor Lupu claims, were 
not much different from those under traditional free exercise analysis 
in the post-Smith environment.253 As a result of narrow constructions 
of the burdens placed on free exercise, government interests usually 
won out except in cases where the religious exercise claims were par-
ticularly strong or the government's interest particularly weak.254 
Although he does not fear the creation of a religious super-class, 
Professor Lupu is concerned that religious liberty legislation, like the 
RLUIPA and the RFRA, will lead to an unhealthy politicization of the 
effort to protect religious liberty.255 Pointing to the debates surround-
ing the enactment of the RFRA and subsequent congressional at-
tempts to draft religious liberty legislation, Professor Lupu contends 
that arguments concerning the drafting of these pieces of legislation 
frequently breaks down along narrowly sectarian lines and over par-
ticularly explosive political issues, like abortion and homosexuality.256 
Looking at the RLUIPA's legislative history, it is apparent that similar 
problems arose again as Congress drafted this most recent legislative 
effort to protect religious expression.257 The RLUIPA is the result of 
several compromises between the civil rights and religious communi-
ties. 258 Despite the concerns expressed by Professor Lupu that such 
debates over the fundamental character of our culture "are not the 
sort of battles for which ordinary politics are well-suited; they cannot 
249 See Walsh, supra note 81, at 203-04. 
250 See Lupu, supra note 105, at 570. 
251 [d. 
252 [d. 
253 [d. 
254 [d. 
255 [d. at 568. 
256 See Lupu, supra note 105, at 583-84. 
257 See supra note 5. 
258 See id. 
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readily be compromised, should not be resolved on the basis of politi-
cal strength, and encourage rather than soften sectarian animosi-
ties,"259 the RLUIPA appears to have emerged from the legislative 
process without creating such difficulties. Professor Lupu's equally 
legitimate concern, however, that the politicization of religious free-
dom yields legislation formulated from the perspective of only the 
most vocal participants in the debate that creates it, has yet to be 
tested in the land use context.260 
Because only a handful of land use cases have been brought un-
der the RLUIPA, it is too early to tell whether the statute's formula 
creates an easier path for certain religious communities than for oth-
ers. As a kind of response to Professor Lupu's concerns, however, one 
court has suggested that the value of legislation like the RLUIPA is 
that it puts government actors-and communities-on notice, and 
encourages them to more thoroughly examine the potential effects of 
land use regulation on religious congregations.261 The Castle Hills 
court stated: 
The Court takes this opportunity to encourage Castle Hills 
and all other similarly situated communities to engage in 
thorough and positive debate and negotiation on the issues 
of zoning of religious organizations and places of worship, 
recognizing that in the arena of religion, all parties need 
trod lightly, out of respect for the beliefs of the adherents 
and out of respect for the importance of religion to our 
larger American culture. Cities must govern the health, 
safety and welfare of their communities, but in so doing, 
should consider carefully the positive and supportive role 
that a place of worship will play in doing SO.262 
Perhaps what the Castle Hills court suggests is not more legislation, 
however, but greater tolerance and a broader conception of our 
communities. 
259 See Lupu, supra note 105, at 584. 
260 See id. at 583. 
261 See Castle Hills First Baptist Church v. City of Castle Hills, 2004 WL 546792 *7, *20 
(W.D. Tex. 2004). 
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B. Another Way in Which the Act May Be Unnecessary: Does the 
Land Use Activity the RLUIPA Seeks to Protect Fall Within 
One of the Many Exemptions of Smith 7 
Professor Lupu argues that the Smith holding has created a "new 
and potent set of exceptions" to its rule of rational basis review for all 
laws of general applicability which have the effect of burdening the 
free exercise ofreligion.263 Among these are hybrid rights and systems 
of individualized assessment like the Supreme Court dealt with in 
Sherbert v. Verner.264 These exceptions to the Smith rule are powerful 
because they guarantee that the challenged law or practice will be 
analyzed using strict scrutiny. Professor Lupu points out that: 
[R] egimes of more open-ended discretion are typically most 
vulnerable to the charge that they are being administered in 
ways hostile to religion or to particular religious sects. Ac-
cordingly, one would expect administrative schemes charac-
terized by a high degree of discretion-zoning schemes are 
the leading candidate-to forfeit the benefit of the Smith 
rule because such schemes fall into one or more exceptions 
to that rule.265 
Thus his argument goes, zoning schemes should not be subject to 
Smith's rule of rational basis review because they are inherently discre-
tionary, and are therefore not laws of general applicability.266 
This is important for two reasons. First, such a conception of the 
effect of the Smith holding on zoning and land use laws goes a long 
way toward making the argument for the RLUIPA's constitutionality. 
The problem with the RLUIPA's predecessor, the RFRA, as expressed 
by the Supreme Court in City of Boerne, was that Congress had created 
a statute that did not respect the law of Smith.267 The RLUIPA's detrac-
tors argue that the statute suffers from the same infirmities and is 
therefore a violation of Congress's power under Section Five of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.268 If the RLUIPA's treatment of zoning and 
land use laws can be reconciled with the Court's decision in Smith, 
263 Id. at 572. 
264 See id. 
266 Id. at 573. 
266 See id. 
267 See supra Part II. 
268 See supra Part II.B. 
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however, there is no constitutional infirmity as far as Congress's re-
medial powers gO.269 
Second, assuming that the RLUIPA is not an expansion of the First 
Amendment right to free exercise of religion, but merely a codification 
of the Supreme Court's Smith holding as it applies to land use regula-
tion, one may wonder why the statute is necessary at all. One suggestion 
is that the RLUIPA gives lawyers and judges another way to frame 
claims arising out of the conflict between local zoning and land use or-
dinances and the free exercise of religious beliefs. While Professor 
Lupu's arguments about judicial atrophy are compelling, there is also a 
legitimate concern that courts will be unwilling to develop the excep-
tions Smith creates. This may have been the case in Tenafly Eruv Ass 'n, 
where the court was unwilling to recognize the plaintiffs free speech 
claim, and therefore their hybrid rights theory, in part because of some 
reluctance to address that element of Smith. In these cases, the RLUIPA 
may provide courts with the least controversial way of applying strict 
scrutiny to land use laws alleged to burden religious freedom. 
CONCLUSION 
The RLUIPA is an attempt on the part of Congress to prevent local 
land use laws from infringing on First Amendment rights. Because of its 
concern that religious groups faced the most hostility in the highly dis-
cretionary environment of land use and zoning administration, Con-
gress chose to narrow its focus to such situations when drafting the 
RLUIPA, its most recent attempt to elucidate the Supreme Court's 
holding in Smith. The effect of the law is an atmosphere in which relig-
ious liberty is more easily protected by courts uncertain of how far to 
push the limits of Smith, at some expense to judicial creativity in free 
exercise jurisprudence. Although the statute may go far in its goal of 
circumscribing a paradigm of cases-free exercise claims involving land 
use schemes-it simultaneously limits the number of opportunities 
courts will have to flex their judicial muscles and expand the scope of 
religious protection in cases which do not involve land use. 
269 This does not mean, however, that the statute is impervious to attacks under the 
Spending Clause and the Commerce Clause. 

